

## Oil & Russia's Geo-political Trigger



	Q1 2022	Q2 2022	Q3 2022	Q4 2022	Q1 2023	Q2 2023
Brent Oil	\$77 - \$115	\$88 - \$138	\$80 - \$120	\$72 - \$100	\$70 - \$96	\$70 - \$93
	\$104	\$112	\$98	\$86	\$78	\$80

### Question of Peak Risk Premium & Persistence

Following Russian attack on, and invasion of, Ukraine, **triple-digit Oil is the new reality with geo-political risk premium getting entrenched**. Questions though are; i) how much higher Oil may go on geo-political risks (peak risk); ii) how long it may persist at elevated levels from geo-political risk premium, and; iii) where it is likely to settle thereafter (as and when geo-political risk premium fades).

### \$100+ Not the Fundamental Default

The pre-supposition is that **\$100+ Oil is not the default for the underlying demand-supply conditions**. Point being, **even with an emergence from the pandemic expected to restore a greater degree of Oil demand**, the **coincidence of OPEC+ restoration** (gradual as it may be into Q4 2022) from self-imposed COVID curbs, prospects for **re-introduction of Iranian Oil** (~2.0MBpD) to global supply, and expectations of **some supply response from Shale** (even if more muted) is consistent with Oil settling below, not sustaining above, \$100 [See Box on Oil Supply Factors overleaf].

### Fundamentals Hijacked

But that said, **fundamentals are temporarily hijacked** by a **conspiracy of Russia-Ukraine conflict, patchy OPEC+ capacity restoration** and **cartel conundrums/constraints**; imposing significant further upside risks to crude prices. And of these, **Russia rules the roost for now**.

### Russia Risks Rule the Roost

Specifically, **with Russia as the second (pre-pandemic)/third (2020) largest exporter of Oil**, the scale of disruption and corresponding *difficulty in readily substituting for Russian supply-at-risk from acute geo-political risks* mean that **price sensitivity to Russian oil disruptions are high**.

As a rough gauge if 30-40% of Russian exports are impacted (corresponding to 3-5% of global supply), prices could jump by 15-30%; which means that **Oil as high as \$115-130 is not unimaginable amid elevated risks of a head-on conflict between Russia and the West**. Of course, the *instinct for market over-reactions means that this is a guide, not necessarily a limit*.

### Geo-Political Fade?

The **consolation is that geo-political risk premium tends to fade within 8-24 weeks** so long as worst case outcomes are averted and conflicts are contained; as has been the experience of recent decades. Admittedly, it is still **difficult to gauge the evolution of geo-political risks until Russia's end-game on Ukraine attacks/invasion surfaces to light**. Nonetheless, **while crude may soar, it will likely not sustain at \$115-130 indefinitely**.

### Capacity to (Eventually) Curtail ...

Instead, **as OPEC+ capacity restoration normalizes into Q4 2022**, and Shale responds to extraordinarily elevated Oil prices, we expect Crude prices to peak into mid-2022 and *gradually decline to \$75-95 into H2 2022 and 2023* [See Table Above]. **Gradual being the operative term**.

### But Compensation & Cartel Taboos Constrain Near-Term

Thing is, **even if Saudi and UAE have spare capacity on paper, the ability to unilaterally exploit this spare capacity within OPEC to offset Russian risks and under-production elsewhere in OPEC+ is compromised**. To say the least this will **involve prohibitively high political costs** entailing cohesiveness within the cartel and the wrath of Russia that is the defacto co-chair.

### Geo-politics Lopsided & Overwhelm Initially

Admittedly, there may be compelling moral suasion by US and European allies for OPEC Saudi and UAE to alleviate acute energy shock risks. But a **token output increase to placate US/Western calls to alleviate Oil risks, rather than tectonic shifts that materially subdue prices and jeopardize the OPEC+ partnership**, appears to be the **middle ground reality in the near-term** (3-6 months).

As a result of which, **upside risks to oil are likely to dominate in the coming 2-6 months as geo-political risks to Oil** (rather than pipeline supply buffers) **are likely to overwhelm initially**.

#### Box: Supply Factors Set to Subdue Oil's Upside

**OPEC+ Supply Restoration:** To be sure, an **unfettered restoration of OPEC+ capacity** to "base" (Oct '18) levels ought to **consistent with \$70-95, rather than triple-digit Oil**. With about another 3-4MBpD of OPEC+ crude output curbed to be eased at a gradual 400KBpD monthly step-up, even with global re-opening demand, demand-supply conditions should turn conducive for inventory building rather than rolling supply crunch.

**Iranian Supply in the Pipeline:** Moreover, *crude price containment will be more effective if Iran's 1.5-2.0MBpD supply is restored with a nuclear deal reinstated*.

**Shale Desensitized, Not Defunct:** What's more, **while Shale output is admittedly considerably constrained** by more exacting *profit demands* and *ESG impediments*, it is **not entirely desensitized to soaring Oil prices**. And so, even with profit and environmental/emissions restraints, prices above \$100 are likely to see rising US output dampening the amplitude and persistence of price shocks.

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