


Why Peak Fed is Not Peak Pain


- As the Fed approaches the end of rate hikes, not only is **anticipatory relief palpable**, but **“pivot” exuberance is building**.
- But our warning is that **cheer is premature**.
- For one, historically downturns coincide with **acute credit tightening after “peak Fed”**.
- What’s more, **risk premium** (in EM Asia) has been **unusually depressed**; under the cover of **exceptional inflation spread inversion** and **indulgent post-pandemic liquidity**.
- But both are **on borrowed time**. And **reversion** underway set **to prompt risk re-pricing**;
- with **China chills threatening to exacerbate economic headwinds, capital outflow/currency depreciation risks**.
- More so as a **strong USD imposes demand pressures and financing risks**.

1. Downturn Risks

Global downturn risks flagged by a **profoundly inverted yield curve**, which has a **remarkable track record for predicting recessions**.




Add to that signs of **fading post-pandemic pent-up demand/buffers** and exceptionally brutal policy tightening and the dangers of a downturn ahead become harder dismiss.



2. Inconvenient Inflation & Geopolitics

While **global inflation** has probably peaked, it remains **uncomfortably elevated, inconveniently sticky**;




and perhaps most worryingly, **exposed to further outburst of cost-shocks** from weather and persistent geo-political risks; be it first-order Russia-Ukraine or derivative via OPEC+.

3. Dangers of Policy Mis-steps from Dissociation

The **dangers of over-tightening are accentuated** by the *dissociation between (dis-)inflation, jobs and demand*, whereby **slowing demand has not materially weakened the labour market and not sufficiently induced dis-inflation.**

Chg in Inflation (Log CPI) VS. Chg in Demand (Log Mfg PMIs):
Inflation Appears Stickier Despite Demand Downturn.




Amid elevated (~\$90) oil in a climate of global manufacturing slump. The odds of, and costs associated with, policy mistakes (*too much tightening for too long*) are high and rising.

4. Tyranny of Long & Variable Lags

Long and variable policy lags amplify policy mis-step risks. Specifically, as the *Fed deems credit tightening sanguine* and policy lags shortened by large, rapid hikes alongside forward guidance.

The Fed has Tended to React Far More Acutely to Tightening Credit Conditions than Tightening Leverage.




The **resultant false sense of comfort** to hold rates high(er) may **perversely precipitate a recession** if far sharper leverage tightening belatedly (amid unfamiliar post-pandemic dynamic) invokes credit shocks.

Policy → Expect the Fed to cut rates sooner and more sharply from H1 2024.

UST Yields → Consequently, near-term upside volatility in UST yields may flip to sharp downside volatility (accentuated initially at the front-end) from late-2023/early-2024.


5. Exceptionalism Exhausted

Inflation Spreads (vs. US): Even as Energy & Food Shocks Dismount Reversion from Current "Inversion" Gathers Pace; from late-stage Services Migration (Tourism) & Fiscal (Buffer) Fade.




An exceptional state of **significantly higher US/DM inflation vis-à-vis EM** (Asia included) in the context of unprecedented global liquidity has imaginably driven an *unusual reduction in risk premium.*

Plunge in 10Y EM Asia Yield Spreads (vis-a-vis UST Yields) Appear Excessive with Respect to Shifts in Risk Sentiments.



But this exceptionalism is on borrowed time; as liquidity drains and EM Asia’s *excess inflation vis-à-vis US is restored* amid a conspiracy of food/energy risks, tourism resumption and stretched subsidies.



6. The Missing Risk Premium Puzzle

This will restore “missing” risk premium (pressuring EM Asia FX/assets) as; i) Fed policy lags catch-up and; ii) unusual (US-Asia) inflation dynamics revert

Risk Premium → Even as “risk-free” rates (Fed Funds rate, UST yields) may be set to fall, risk premium could rise sharply. **This will obfuscate the outlook of rates in EM Asia.**

7. Amplified by China

China risks comprising deep-seated economic distress (including far-reaching property impact) and geo-political threats could very well **catalyse risk premium restoration**; potentially comprising a less orderly sell-off in EM Asia assets/currencies.


Not just via supply-chain and investment drag. But also, **capital outflow risks** deriving from **chronic CNY depreciation spill-over** and/or potential China credit risk blowout.

8. Don't Dismiss (Strong) USD Risks

Despite **received wisdom** about “**peak USD**”, it would be **unwise to dismiss** the occurrence and impact of a **strong USD too soon**. Atypically, despite late-stage Fed tightening/peak cycle, USD;

- i) retains *real yield advantage* amid relative economic out-run and dis-inflation edge, and;
- ii) the boost from *haven allure* amid uncertainty

USD Impact → Exceptional real rate advantages of the USD and lack of allure in the alternatives (G10 FX) may prolong USD strength until very aggressive Fed rate cuts and bottoming of economic gloom.



This will **dampen and defer sustained gains against the Greenback** (into H2 2024).

Meanwhile, it could **accentuate capital outflow risks** correlated, and often proportional, to “twin deficit” and inflation vulnerabilities.

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