MIZHO

22 Sep

WEEK AHEAD

Mizuho Bank, Ltd. Asia and Oceania Treasury Department Tel: 65-6805-2000 Fax: 65-6805-2095

Vishnu Varathan | Tan Boon Heng

https://www.voutube.com/@MizuhoMacroView Subscribe to our Youtube Channel

44 0/47 7

3.0%/4.3%

-0.10

20-Sep-2023	One MIZUHO Building the future with you
-------------	--

to highlight key data/events

Economic Calendar G3 Date Survey* Prior Country Period 19 Sep US Building Permits/Housing Starts Aua 1440k/1437k 1443k/1452k ΕZ CPI/Core YoY Aug F 5.3%/5.3% 20 Sep JP Trade Balance -¥678.5b -¥66.3b Aug US ion (Lov 21 Sep US Current Account Balance 20 -\$221.3b -\$219.3b US Initial Jobless Claims 225k 220k US Philadelphia Fed Business Outlook Sep -1.0 12.0 US Aug -0.5% -0.4% Leading Index

JP **BOJ Policy Balance** Week-in-brief: Peak, Proclivity & Persistence

F7

JP

JP

Week-in-brief: Peak, Proclivity & Persistence - "What you do in this world is a matter of no consequence. The question is what can you make people believe you have done." - Shertock Holmes, A Study in Scarlett - Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's distilled wisdom conveyed by Shertock Holmes will resonate at the September FOMC. Specifically, it is not so much what the Fed does (hike or skip) that will matter as much as it's ability to convince markets what it has done ... and could continue to do. - Simply put, perceptions could, and perhaps will, matter more than just pulling the trigger on one more 25bp hike at this juncture. - And these perceptions may be unpacked into policy guidance on; i) potential peak rate; ii) pustained proclivity to tighten (subject to data-dependence of course) beyond the peak, and; iii) persistence of elevated rates.

Sep P

Sep P

Aug

Mfg/Services PMI

Mfa/Services PMI

CPI/Core YoY

ii) sustained proclivity to tighten (subject to data-dependence or course) beyong the peak, and,
iii) persistence of elevated rates.
With some flair and luck, the optimal combination of policy decision, statement, hetoric and the quarterly Dot Plot' update will go a long way to shape perceptions of a Fed that is neither recklessly hawkish nor prematurely dovish, instead positioning itself as a reliable steward of price stability.
If the Fed achieves this, then the bet on peak USD will remain respectful of upside proclivity given a compromised EUR that is deferential on stagflation-type European under-performance.
Some persistence of USD tone, especially against EM Asia FX as well as commodity units may also have to be acknowledged; even if the precise durability of this cannot be ascertained.
More so, as the persistence of Beijing's property boosting measures are already strained amid waning sales boost. The horcivity for doubt and potentially more downside in the Chinese property sector doesn't anonear to be displayed on vincingly.

appear to be dispelled convincingly. Nor may optimists declare that generalised confidence deficit in China has peaked.

- Nor may optimists declare that generalised confidence deficit in China has peaked.
 - Given the underlying persistence of uncertainty and procivity for USD/UST yield upside to exert pressures on AXJ, EM Asia central banks might have to recant earlier declarations of peak rates. To be sure, we expect BSP, Bank Indonesia and BNM will all stand pat. But they are a long way off signalling proclivity for cuts; and arguably premature in decisively caling for peak (rates).
 - In particular given the persistence of inflationary pressures amid fresh upswing in global energy prices conspiring with food-inflation inflicted by EI Niño.
 - In fact, the BoJ might have to pull a nuanced hawkish calibration out of its hat if persistence of JPY pressures threaten to push peak USD/JPY rates much higher.
 - All said, best to buckle up for the Sep FOMC week with activist PBoC and an "activated" BoJ all working through peaks, procivity and persistence. The game is afoot!
 FOMC: How Hawkish a Hold

FOMC: How Hawkish a Hold - That's the question we are confronted with when the Fed convenes for the Sep FOMC (20th Sep).

Specifically, how it posiotion a "skip" in its on-going tightening cycle that expressly; i) leaves keep hawkish options on the table, and crucially; ii) conveys the propensity to prolong a state of elevated rates instead of promptly tipping into cuts from the "peak".
 The ECB's recent Sep meeting, where markets aggressively traded the "dovish" aspect of a hike is a

case in point for proactively leaning against pent-up pivot trades in the wings. - Although a partial consolation is that warm-to-hot US data prints across inflation, ISM services and

Although a partial consolation is that warm-to-hot US data prints across inflation, ISM services and retail sales may still underpin the USD (perhaps even UST yields) given the narrative of US exceptionalism; whereby dire European activity accentuate relative US resilience.
In any case, there are three aspects of the FOMC actions and posturing that matter.
Eirst, is the actual rate decision on whether or not to hike. Here, a "skip" is our base case.
Apart from the breathing space the Fed has after 525bp of hikes, our suspicion is that the actual hawkish signals from rate hikes (on their own) are blunted (the ECB being a case on point).
Second, is the rheoric - both published (in the statement) and delivered at the press conference.
Having already struck the balance between two-way risks, the bar is higher to unequivocally impress upon markets a strong hawkish bias.
Finally, and possibly holding the greatest potential for impact, is the "Dot Plot". In particular, an upward revision to 2023 and/or 2024 terminal rates will deliver an unchallenged hawkish jolt.
The question is, whether this will be an overkill even for the more strident hawks.
Our sense is that a rate hold, combined with allusions of "more (hawkish) work to be done" and a "Dot

The guession is, whether this will be an overkill even for the more strident nawks.
 Our sense is that a rate hold, combined with allusions of "more (hawkish) work to be done" and a "Dot Plot" retaining the option for one more hike in 2023, but with fewer cuts in 2024 (than the 100bp reduction in the June iteration) may deliver the nuanced retention of a hawkish bias.
 And that might be sufficient to keep UST yields underpinned and USD backstopped (if not buoyed) in the context of US exceptionalism (by contrast with Europe).

Bo.I: Of Mountains & Molehills

We have asserted that the (weak/pressured) JPY is "a BoJ problem with a Fed solution".
 Our position on that remains unchanged. But for clarity, this is not a reference of ability (or lackthereof) of the BoJ to impose hawkish shifts that lift the JPY. To be BoJ has options.

of the BOJ to Impose hawkish shirts that uit the JPT. To be BOJ has options. - Rather, it is a sobering cost-benefit deduction, that it would be *liscally ruinous* and *entail too much economic pain* for the benefit of lifting the JPY against an exceptionally hawkish Fed. - What's more, it also exposes JPY to acute upside volatility on a Fed pivot, which can be just as *deleterious* for an economy only just emerging tentatively from deflation. - Nevertheless, a hawkish Fed resulting in upside risks to UST yields inflicting unrelenting pressures on the INF.

the JPY admittedly makes a more compelling case for the BoJ to indulge in further policy calibrations to tighten at the margin. This appears to be supported by Governor Ueda's reference to shedding NIRP (negative interest rate policy) settings. - But the <u>critical distinction</u> that needs making is that a **likely one-off (10bp) shift to ZIRP from NIRP is**


not by a long shot an enduring tightening cycle. - Simply put, it is a molehill to limit excessive JPY pressures, not a mountain on which BoJ policy plants a

Simply Dut it is a molernin to immediate source of a pressure, not a molernin on which bod pointy hawkish flag. The policy risk balance simply cannot endure such a jarring shift.
So best not to make a mountain (hawkish inflection) out of a molehill (of NIRP exit to ZIRP).
Consequently, instinctive JPY rebound could also be on a short leash, non sustained bull run.

Afterall, calibration out of NIRP, which is a *mere 10bp* worth of tightening in quantum, ought to be less impactful than; i) previous YCC band widening (which was effectively 25bp lift) as well as; ii) recent "non-rigid" YCC rendition that dynamically endows 10-50bp of upside to yields.
 Upshot is, overly-enthused JPY bulls chasing (BoJ) mountain may end up tripping on molehills.




ng I



Source Eark Indonesia's Music tank ties it's separated - Bank Indonesia's meeting will be expected to be about mitigating risks as they stand pat on policy rates. While Indonesia's headline inflation also header higher in August similar to the regional trend, the surge has been smaller in magnitude and below expectations. - What's more, core CPI dis-inflation provides relief for BI. - To yet again emphasize, IDR pressures have not abated with the IDR declining 0.8% (as of 13 Sept) since BI's previous meeting. To be clear, BI's measures are meant to mitigate excessive IDR depreciation and financial instability rather than trigger IDR rallies. - Admittedly, BI's FX Exports Proceeds Term deposit facility has seen stronger inflows after their mandatory exports repatriation ruling. (See LHS Chart above) - Nonetheless, fading commodity prices imply lower export revenues available for repatriation. Consequently, dwindling trade surplus from fading commodity tailwinds imply that mitigation of IDR risks remain at the forefront of BI's policy calculus. BSP: Not All Bumpos Are Equal **BSP: Not All Bumps Are Equal**

Contribution to Inflation: Bumped Up inflation path on higher food inflation sharpens



Despite the bump up in headline inflation in August to 5.3% from July's 4.7%, we retain our base case for the BSP to stand pat and keep the overnight borrowing rate unchanged. - However, this is not ignoring the worrying food inflation which required the implementation of rice price ceilings. Nonetheless, the authorities remain hopeful that on-going import negotiations and local

price ceilings. Nonetheless, the authorities remain hopeful that on-going import nee harvest coming on-stream in the month ahead will dampen inflation acceleration.

Aside from food, rising oil prices are additional woes which imply a dissipation of oil's deflation and also worsens their already dire current account deficits.

worsens their already dire current account deficits. - Growth worries continue to be the bugbear with medium term communications by the BSP surrounding the conditions allowing rate cuts in 2024. Ine near term, the bumpy headline inflation path not durably settling in the BSP's range backs the case to hold rates. - That said, not all bumps are equal, given the timing of the BSP meeting right after the Fed, one has to acknowledge that a surprise bump up of 25bp by the Fed will likely trigger the BSP to take rates higher. The concern being that PHP depreciation pressures has immediate feedback into imported inflation. After all, USD/PHP which has been testing 57 and a further wave of Greenback resurgence leading the surprise tradement in the 2022) is not off the table.



USD Mn 20000 -Primary Income: Credit Primary Income: Debit Primary Income 15000 5000 -5000 -15000
 (1)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)
 (2)</td

Source CEC Made Bask
 Since the CBC's previous decision to hold rates in June, the policy calculus has gotten more complicated. While headline CPI enjoyed a generous bout of dis-inflation from Jan-Jun, its resurgence to 2.5% in August heightens the threat of unanchored inflation expectations with core inflation remaining sticky at 2.6%. Nonetheless, given that 02 GDP growth (1.4% YoY) staging an incomplete recovery from 01 (-3.3% YoY), a negative output gap pares back the odds of a further hike.
 In addition, the CBC will also be watching for financial stability risks in the insurance industry which faces deteriorating balance sheet plaqued with significant unrealised losses and FX risks.
 We retain our base case for a prolong hold at their meeting on 21 September given that a further 3 month window for monetary policy transmission is within reasonable bounds.
 That said, we assign a 10% probability of another 12.5bps to take the policy rate to 2.00% in consideration of tight labour labour underpinning ocre inflation.
 Nonetheless, any surprise hike will be unlikely to boost the TWD given structural headwinds. Substantial primary income inflows seen in H1 may soften in H2 and rising energy prices inflating import expenditures will narrow current account surplus.

Dooking ahead, TWD will also face political complications as elections heat up.

5.3%/5.3%

43 5/47 9

49.6/54.3

3.3%/4.3%

Asia

Forex Rate

	Close*	Chg^	% Chg^	We	ek Fore	ecast
USD/JPY	147.85	0.020	0.01%	145.00	1	148.80
EUR/USD	1.0657	-0.0043	-0.40%	1.058	1	1.080
USD/SGD	1.3636	-0.002	-0.15%	1.3580	1	1.3700
USD/THB	35.815	0.157	0.44%	35.40	1	36.20
USD/MYR	4.6833	0.006	0.13%	4.650	~	4.720
USD/IDR	15353	25	0.16%	15,220	~	15,500
JPY/SGD	0.9221	-0.002	-0.18%	0.913	~	0.945
AUD/USD	0.6432	0.006	0.88%	0.625	1	0.650
USD/INR	83.18	0.235	0.28%	82.5	1	83.8
USD/PHP	56.812	0.172	0.30%	56.1	1	57.2

Weekly change

FX Outlook: Sidelined USD Bears - Whether the Fed hikes or not (and most likely it will not) is beside the point (and of little respite) for sidelined USD bears.

- In fact, even if the Fed does not indulge overtly hawkish flex, much less bite, the case for short USD bets setback to come up for air may be somewhat compromised.
 - The most unequivocal case not to bet against the USD in the run up to, and arguably even after, the FOMC would be hawkish caveats and sound bites that are likely to accompany a hold.

This, we expect, would keep UST yields elevated, if not at least backstopped, and that ought to retain some

This, we expect, would keep 031 yields elevated, in for at least backstopped, and that ought to retain some traction in the USD.
 Especially with inflation's recent reacceleration alongside robust consumer appetite.
 Crucially, even if the FOMC remarks were to come across as being less aggressively hawkish, the relative

hawkish hold (emphasis on hawkish) vis-a-vis the ECB's dovish hike (dovish being the operative term) is likely to In particular as US exceptionalism draws a stark contrast to relative economic gloom (amid stagflation-type risks) in Europe. What's more, this is backed by real rate advantages of the USD.

The only scenario in which the USD could, unexpectedly, tumble sharply is if the pause was accompanied by

 Ine only scenario in window the OSD could, unexpectedly, turnot estimative is in the passe was accompanied by reduced 'Do't Plot' as this could catalyse a more acute Fed pivot bet that drags the USD.
 In EM Asia, hawkish Fed hues suggest deference to USD dominance broadly.
 Although, aggressive PBoC support for CNH initially and pre-BoJ caution around upward yield/rate calibrations squeezing JPY shorts coursel some restraint, rather than total abandon, in short AXJ vs. USD positions. - This FOMC week, it appears that side-lined USD bears may find little relief. But equally, more calibrated hawkish tuning amid a rate hold alongside PBoC and BoJ pushback on excessive (CNH and JPY) weakness favour measures momentum and nimble positioning.

JPY: Surges, Trips and Retrea

JP1: Surges, Tings and reverat
Higher UST yields and surging Brent prices alongside BoJ's pushback on interperatation of Governor Ueda's remarks had JPY bulls retreating last week.
Nonetheless, outright bets for JPY bears this week warrant caution as JPY bears may trip not merely because of BoJ policy but also due to the fact that intervention risk remains live.
All in, this week USD deferrence is our base case and as such USD/JPY is expected to trade in the 145-149 range given that any upgrades in the Fed's Dot Plot will justifably send UST yields higher.

EUR: No Room

 As we had flagged last week "a surprise hike will also imply that the policy room gets even tighter ahead which is no win for EUR bulls", the EUR fell to mid-1.06 post the ECB's hike.
 Meanwhile, insistence from ECB officials that this may not not the peak rate alongside calls for a faster pace of balancesheet reduction may assist in consolidation in the 1.06-1.07 range That said, shallow test of 1.06 will be par for the course on further hawkish Fed guidance

SGD: Range-bound

- USD/SGD tested 1.3650 levels last week, as broadbased USD rally got some respite heading into the We expect SGD movements for the weak ahead to be driven mainly by developments in the US. In

We expect SGD movements for the weak ahead to be driven mainly by developments in the US. In particular, any upward revision to 2023 and/or 2024 terminal rates, would weigh on the SGD.
 We expect CNH and EUR to serve as counteracting forces on the SGD. While hints of an end of ECB's hiking cycle paves the way to a softer EUR, CNH may stabilise this week with better-than-expected data print last week. As PBoC is likely to keep the LPR rates unchanged this week, CNH volatility will be more externally driven rather than domestically induced.
 USD/SGD to trade range-bound between 1.36 and 1.37 levels going into FOMC meeting.

AUD: China Risks

Cautious consolidation rather than unmitigated weakness could be the theme for the AUD, despite our expectations for USD to retain, if not extend, traction. • But this is mainly due to much of the weakness already being baked in; having fallen fairly sharply over

a couple of months from 0.67-0.68 levels to mid-0.63 to 0.65-ish levels.

- Moreover, the RBA is also likely to retain the option to tighten more instead of beating a retreat with a hasty and unconditional abandomment of tightening bias; especially sticky inflation and supported jobs provide justification for not capitulating just yet. - In addition, indirect AUD support from the PBoC's emphatic CNY buoyancy efforts could be further

- This is bound to provide distinct fillip for commodities, which in turn is likely to endow AUD with upside via commodity channels.

Expect AUD to be dealt in the mid-0.63 to low-0.65 with caution limiting upside, but oddly, not so during potential espisodes of volatility around FOMC and China headlines

Bond Yield (%)

17-Sep	2-yr	Chg (bp)^	10-yr	Chg (bp)^	Curve
USD	5.033	4.2	4.332	6.8	Steepening
GER	3.205	14.1	2.671	6.5	Flattening
JPY	0.017	1.8	0.703	5.9	Steepening
SGD	3.489	7.6	3.251	7.1	Flattening
AUD	3.849	3.7	4.101	0.1	Flattening
GBP	4.995	-4.4	4.352	-6.5	Flattening
Stock Market					

	Close	% Chg
S&P 500 (US)	4,450.32	-0.16
Nikkei (JP)	33,533.09	2.84
EuroStoxx (EU)	4,295.05	1.37
FTSE STI (SG)	3,280.69	2.27
JKSE (ID)	6,982.79	0.84
PSEI (PH)	6,126.34	-1.55
KLCI (MY)	1,459.03	0.28
SET (TH)	1,542.03	-0.33
SENSEX (IN)	67,838.63	1.86
ASX (AU)	7,279.03	1.71

US Treasuries: Of Headlines and Closing Plots


 Inevitably the plot heading into the FOMC has thickened as markets contemplate the "in line" inflation print which saw headline inflation rise as well as the ECB's choice to hike last week.


To be upfront, while our call is for yields to remain buoyant to trade in the 4.95%-5.15%, the extent of upside on 2Y UST yields will likely be determined by the Dot Plot.
 To be clear, room for upside is not numerically translated from the exact shift in Dot Plot

but rather it will be derived from the **pushback on the "closure" rate cut bets.** - That said, it looks inevitable that a status quo Dot Plot will excite UST bulls as they latch onto the peak rate narrative barring clear policy direction from Fed Chair Powell which at

What is more certain though is that longer end UST yields remains backstopped by defict needs and trade in the 4.25-4.45%.

Looking further, shutdown threats in November may soon enlarge volatility on the very short end of USTs.





MIZHO

Important Information

This publication has been prepared by Mizuho Bank, Ltd. ("Mizuho") and represents the views of the author. It has not been prepared by an independent research department and it has not been prepared in accordance with legal requirements in any country or jurisdiction designed to promote the independence of investment research and is not subject to any prohibition on dealing ahead of the dissemination of investment research. MHBK provides this information for free. Please request for cancellation of subscription if you do not want to receive free-of-charge information from MHBK.

Disclaimer

Unless otherwise stated, all views or opinions herein are solely those of the author(s) as of the date of this publication and are not to be relied upon as authoritative or taken in substitution for the exercise of judgement by any recipient, and are subject to change without notice.

This publication has been prepared by Mizuho solely from publicly available information. Information contained herein and the data underlying it have been obtained from, or based upon, sources believed by us to be reliable, but no assurance can be given that the information, data or any computations based thereon are accurate or complete. This publication provides general background information only. It is information in summary form and does not purport to be complete. This publication has been prepared for information purposes only and is not intended by Mizuho or its affiliates to constitute investment, legal, accounting, tax or other advice of any kind and all recipients of this publication are advised to contact independent advisors in order to evaluate the publication, including, without limitation, the suitability of any security, commodity, futures contract or instrument or related derivative (hereinafter, a "financial instrument"), product or strategy herein described. This publication is not intended to be relied upon as advice to investors or potential investors and does not take into account investment objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular investor. It is not intended for persons who are restricted in accordance with US, Japanese, Singapore or any other applicable securities laws.

This publication has been prepared for information purposes only and is not intended by Mizuho to market any financial instrument, product or service or serve as a recommendation to take or refrain from taking any particular course of action or participate in any trading or other strategy. This publication is not an offer to buy or sell or a solicitation of any offer to buy or sell any security or any of the assets, businesses or undertakings described herein, or any other financial instrument, nor is it an offer to participate in any trading or other strategy. Nothing contained herein is in any way intended by Mizuho or its affiliates to offer, solicit and/or market any financial instrument, product or service, or to act as any inducement to enter into any contract or commitment whatsoever. Neither the author, Mizuho nor any affiliate accepts any liability whatsoever with respect to the use of this publication or its contents or for any errors or omissions herein.

Mizuho and its affiliates, connected companies, employees or clients may take the other side of any order by you, enter into transactions contrary to any recommendations contained herein or have positions or make markets or act as principal or agent in transactions in any securities mentioned herein or derivative transactions relating thereto or perform or seek financial or advisory services for the issuers of those securities or financial instruments.

All of the information contained in this publication is subject to further modification without prior notice and any and all opinions, forecasts, projections or forward-looking statements contained herein shall not be relied upon as facts nor relied upon as any indication of future results. Opinions stated in this publication are subject to change without notice. Future results may materially vary from such opinions, forecasts, projections or forward-looking statements. The information contained in this publication may not be current due to, among other things, changes in the financial markets or economic environment. Mizuho has no obligation to update any information contained in this publication. Past performance is not indicative of future performance.

This is a strictly privileged and confidential publication. This publication contains information addressed only to a specific individual and is not intended for distribution to, or use by, any person other than the named addressee or any person or entity in any jurisdiction or country where such distribution or use would be contrary to law or regulation. Save with Mizuho's prior written consent, you may not disclose, divulge, reproduce or furnish any information contained herein to any other party. Please notify the sender immediately if you have mistakenly received this publication.

Singapore: Mizuho is licensed as a bank under the Banking Act (Chapter 19) of Singapore, and is regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore.

Japan: Mizuho is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Agency of Japan.

United Kingdom / European Economic Area: In the UK, Mizuho is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of MHBK's regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority are available upon request. This publication may also be distributed by Mizuho International plc ("MHI"). MHI is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority.

United States: This publication is not a "research report" as defined in Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") Regulations 1.71 and 23.605. The content of publications distributed by Mizuho Securities USA Inc. ("MSUSA") is the responsibility of MSUSA. The content of publications distributed directly to US customers by Mizuho is the responsibility of Mizuho. US investors must effect any order for a security that is the subject of this report through MSUSA. © 2014 Mizuho Bank Ltd.