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Asia

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One MIZUHO

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Date Country		Event	Period	Survey*	Prior	
23 Oct	US	Chicago Fed Nat Activity Index	Sep	-0.1%	-0.2	
24 Oct	US	Richmond Fed Mfg Index	Oct	3.0	5.0	
	EZ	PMI Mfg / Services	Oct P	43.6 / 48.6	43.4 / 48.	
	JP	PMI Mfg / Services	Oct P		48.5 / 53.	
25 Oct	US	New Home Sales	Sep	682k	675k	
	JP	Coincident Index / Leading Index CI	Aug F		114.3 / 109	
	GE	IFO Business Climate / Expectations	Oct	85.9 / 83.5	85.7 / 82.	
26 Oct	US	Initial Jobless Claim	Oct-21	208k	198k	
	US	GDP Annualized QoQ	3Q A	4.3%	2.1%	
	US	Durable Goods Orders / Nondef Ex Air	Sep P	1.5% / 0.0%	0.1% / 0.9	
	EZ	ECB Main Refinancing Rate	Oct-26	4.50%	4.50%	
27 Oct	US	U. of Mich. Sentiment	Oct F	63.0	63.0	
	US	PCE / Core Deflator YoY	Sep	3.4% / 3.7%	3.5% / 3.9	
	US	U. of Mich. 1Y / 5-10Y Inflation	Oct F	3.8% / -	3.8% / 3.0	
	US	Personal Income / Spending	Sep	0.4% / 0.5%	0.4% / 0.4	

Week-in-brief: Exceptionalism Misgauged & Exoneration Misplaced The week is frighteningly fertile for policy and geo-political miscalculations; one threatening to amplify the other. Especially as US exceptionalism, misgauged to be more pronounced than it really is, collides with premature hopes of exoneration from the worst of geo-political accidents.
 With Q3 US GDP (Thu) expected to print an annualized 4.3% QoQ the narrative for US exceptionalism and attendant hawkish Fed posturing will be hard to dial back.
 More so, if PCE and core PCE prints suggest that inflation has not cooled as quickly as hoped for.
 But in any case, potential cost shock associated with beinthened ree-notifical risks inplint through energy.

More so, if PCE and core PCE prints suggest that inflation has not cooled as quickly as hoped for.
 But in any case, potential cost shocks associated with heightened geo-political risks rippling through energy and perhaps food further amplify the propensity for policy miscalculations.
 Against this backdrop, "risk off" sentiments and increasing pressures on EM Asia assets could prevail.
 Which could spell even more acute pain if geo-political risks flare on wider spill-over of the Gaza conflict, as a war involving Lebanon and/or Iran provies; as global efforts to at least contain, if not defuse, nevertheless fail to exonerate wider Middle East conflict risks.
 And even in this scenario, the worst-case play out, In particular, if a geo-political crisis that is short of panic continues to deny meaningful exoneration of misgivings about US fiscal/debt deterioration.
 In which case, an unfamiliar and unnerving mix of elevated long-end UST yields accentuate pain all arrund as cavital lifet in the prevention.

In which case, an unfamiliar and unnerving mix of elevated long-end UST yields accentuate pain all around as capital flight to haven offer ittle reprive even for higher quality assets elsewhere;
as elevated UST yields set the basel-line risk-free rates that determine (softer) valuations and drive up risk premium instead. Against this backdrop, higher inflation exposures and "twin deficit" risks in EM Asia and elsewhere may inevitably be subject to more jarning shake-dow.
Bank Indonesia's surprise 25bp hike last week, expressly alluding to rupiah stability motivations, express a desire to pre-empt such "tail risks". And it raises not just uncomfortable questions of policy adequacy for many EM Asia central banks; and for some it raises the ante as well.
And if the conspicuous absence of rupiah traction post-hike is anything to go by, the connundrum from misgauged US exceptionalism and misplaced (hopes of) exoneration for EM risks is laid bare.
All said, EM Asia and (perceived) higher-risk FX/assets may be positioned precariously, if not outright subject more pain this week. And the ECB's abstinence from a rate hike amid uncertainties may not be commany EM Asia central banks not tightening further. But may perversely accentuate FX volatility if a weaker EUR exerts wider drag across global FX (against the Greenback).
Elsewhere, nascent bottoming in Korea's GDP and Vietnam's activity may be welcome relief.
But this relief is not to be mistaken for exoneration of lingering downside risks. Certainly not cause for exuberance About exceptionalism for impending industrial (and on-going) /tourism turnaround.

Vietnam: Of Risks And Relief



October economic data release will cast a spotlight on the shortfall of Q4 activity pick-up.
 To be sure, the services sector recovery is likely to be boosted by tourin-driven uptick in retail sales that is set to persist. Nonetheless, the strength of a real recovery is likely to have been dented by the resurgence in inflation which would have dented household purchasing power.

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ECB: A Pause, Not End

ECB: A Pause, Not End - The overhang of weak growth would likely see ECB pausing at the next policy meeting (26 Oct). - Concerns on weak growth appear to have gained traction since the ECB's growth downgrade in September, where ECB observed that the contraction in manufacturing had spilled over to services. - Recent remarks by Lagarde similarly revealed warness on the delayed impact of monetary policy on growth, as well as weaker global economy amid heightened geo-political risks. - A pause, if it materialises, would not signal the end of tightening as the ECB remains overtly focussed on inflation. A still-tight labour market and the latent risk of Oirs geo-political flare-up could potentially unmoor inflation expectations to be anchored despite elevated data prints, and viewed it as 'a major achievement', displays a keen intent on keeping expectations anchored. - That said, at this juncture, the ECB does not have the necessary growth resilience to raise rates to pre-empt a resurgence of inflation; and will have to rely on on-going monetary policy transmission of cumulative hikes thus far. Nonetheless, utilisation of a wider set of policy tools may increasingly be a consideration into year-end.

nsideration into year-end

Date Country		Event	Period	Survey*	Prior	
23 Oct	SG	CPI / Core YoY	Sep	4.0%/ 3.1%	4.0% / 3.4%	
	TH	Customs Exports / Imports YoY	Sep	-1.5%/-5.6%	2.6% / -12.8%	
TW		Unemployment Rate	Sep	3.4%	3.4%	
	тw	Industrial Production YoY	Sep	-8.0%	-10.5%	
24 Oct	AU	PMI Mfg / Services	Oct P		48.7 / 51.8	
	KR	PPI YoY	Sep		1.0%	
25 Oct	AU	CPI YoY	Sep	5.3%	5.2%	
	KR	Retail Sales YoY	Sep		3.3%	
26 Oct	SG	Unemployment rate SA	Sep		1.9%	
	SG	Industrial Production YoY	Sep	-4.0%	-12.1%	
	KR	GDP YoY	3Q A	1.1%	0.9%	
27 Oct	AU	PPI YoY	3Q		3.9%	
29 Oct	VN	Retail Sales YoY	Oct		7.5%	
	VN	Industrial Production YoY	Oct		5.1%	
	VN	Exports / Imports YoY	Oct		4.6% / 2.6%	
	VN	CPI YoY	Oct		3.7%	

23-Oct-2023

Korea Q3 GDP: Extended Bottoms?

O C

th plunging investment spending and retail sales dismal. Q3 GDP is at risk of disappointment. % Yo)





Our bottomline is that Korea's Q3 GDP might be up for another disappointment.
 While our expectations are for Q3 GDP YoY growth to maintain at 0.9% YoY which is similar to that in Q2, it still represents a slowdown in momentum with QoQ growth slowing to 0.3% QoQ SA in Q3 from

Q2, it still represents a **slowdown in momentum** with QoQ growth slowing to 0.3% QoQ SA in Q3 from the 0.6% posted in Q2. Weaker retail sales over July and August point to **eroding support from private consumption**. - Furthermore, given that their return to a current account surplus was in part driven by **import compression**, the **exports recovery at a modest pace may not impart significant growth multipliers** for the industrial sector. Reflecting so, **industrial production levels remain relatively flat on average** over July and August relative to Q2. At this juncture, the semiconductor production recovery has yet to broaden into the wider manufacturing sector.

over July and August relative to Q2. At this juncture, the semiconductor production recovery has yet to broaden into the wider manufacturing sector. - The lacklustre external demand recovery also appears to spillover and constrained investment spending as expenditure on equipment investments contracted. - These doured business sentiments were also reflected by the Business Survey index which indicated worsening current business conditions and a poorer outlook. - Admittedly, services is a bright spot given a 17% surge in average monthly arrivals over Jul-Aug relative to Q2. That said, tourism revenues falling short of arrivals dampens optimism. - On balance, subdued growth momentum is likely to have extended into Q3. While an upside GDP surprise may arise from subdued import demand (from lower corporate and household demand), it is a nocition of weakness and not strength. position of weakness and not strength.

The Ringgit Puzzle-Conundrum

s incident of the dog (that did not bark) in the night-time" – Sherlock Holmes

- Sherlock Holmes' "curious incident of the dog that did not bark" comes to mind when

one tries to square ringgit under-performance amid surging Oil prices Especially given that received wisdom dictates that as the only net oil exporter in the region, the MYR typically gains the upper hand; further **bolstered by** obvious and significant fiscal gains (from both tax

and dividend bump-up). Even more puzzlingly, MYR Ringgit not

only failed to out-perform regional currencies, but has decidedly under-performed; defying further implied fiscal boost from major budget overhaul to rein in subsidies that have followed Oil's

surge.



Jun-23 Aug-23 - That the ringgit defied the boost from Oil and scorned purported fiscal fillip to under-perform, hitting record For a start, it real rate spreads (vs. USD) threaten to turn a lot more unfavourable

- And perversely more so as the subsidy rollback hits price pressures, and consequently higher inflation - What's more, amid US exceptionalism, surging Oil prices fuel hawkish Fed expectations; and resultant

USD dominance overwhelming expected MYR gains (otherwise to be derived from Oil). - So, medium-term fiscal benefits come at the cost of near-term monetary policy d sufficiently offset by rising oil prices; manifesting as ringgit headwinds. dile

The "damned if I do, damned if I don!" options of a policy response ultimately either; concede economic headwinds from higher rates, and attendant debt burden on a stretched economy, or; stake macro and ringgit stability, should monetary response be withheld.
 And to be sure, the fiscal-monetary trade-off is not an entirely myopic zero-sum game. Instead, there is a

And to be sure, the fiscal-indicativity fade-on is not an initial influence of the sure of the fiscal overhault to revoke blanket subsidies in favour of targeted cost relief is right way to go, the concern may be with the execution of such political slability risks amid inadvertent fiscal shortfall further complicate near-term real rate headwinds undermining MYR.

Forex Rate

	Close*	Chg^	% Chg^	We	ek For	ecast
USD/JPY	149.86	0.290	0.19%	147.80	~	150.50
EUR/USD	1.0594	0.0084	0.80%	1.042	~	1.069
USD/SGD	1.3725	0.003	0.23%	1.3650	~	1.3800
USD/THB	36.513	0.235	0.65%	35.80	~	36.80
USD/MYR	4.7677	0.039	0.83%	4.720	~	4.780
USD/IDR	15875	192	1.22%	15,700	~	16,000
JPY/SGD	0.9157	0.000	0.03%	0.907	~	0.934
AUD/USD	0.6314	0.002	0.29%	0.620	~	0.646
USD/INR	83.12	-0.144	-0.17%	82.8	~	83.6
USD/PHP	56.845	0.032	0.06%	56.3	~	57.2

EX Outlook: Look Outl

It appears that Greenback has settled into side-ways motion; specifically, appearing to have become more restrained last week, as it slipped of the highs hit after Israel-Hamas trigger. But this would be a misguided

restrained last week, as it supped of the nights hit after israel-hamas trigger. But this would be a misguided interpretation of calm, when it is in fact an uneasy and precarious pause. So look out! - EUR recovering back to levels before the Israel-Hamas conflict may also be misconstrued to suggest some degree of "normalization"; but this possibly positioning ahead of ECB. - Speaking of which, the ECB is widely expected to hold. But that will still constitute pivot risks to look out for; as less hawkish interpretations of caution may lead to EUR self-off.

ek volatility has the potential to catch markets wrong-fo And this late-we

And this late-week volatility has the potential to catch markets wrong-tooted.
 What's more, Gold, which was up some 3% last week (despite a mild slip in USD that appears not to have piggy-backed to the same extent on haven demand for the corresponding period), warns that markets still need to look out for geo-political tail risks from Gaza and wider geo-politics.
 And so, this sets the stage for Gold, USD, JPY And CHF to squeeze out EM and higher beta currencies. Moreover, the rise in oil prices could also hurt the likes of PHP, INR, THB and KRW.

Which means both direct geo-politics and its consequent risks via energy loom

In EM Asia, pressures on IDR despite BI hike and sustained MYR slippage risks defying higher Oil speak to a conspiracy of risk aversion, higher long-end UST yields and US exceptionalism raising the bar for EM Asia FX to be able to exploit any signs of USD relenting.

- Especially as a soft CNH falls short of the necessary underwriting for EM Asia FX buoyancy.
 - In addition, JPY also poses a duality of downside risks to EM Asia FX. On one hand, via sympathetic deference to USD and high UST yields, which is supportive of USD.

- But on the other, elevated intervention risks near 150 may squeeze out JPY shorts, and consequently carry trades, with little warning. This in turn could come at the cost of high-beta currencies, putting AUD, INR and IDR at risk.

JPY: 'Extremely High' Caution and Threats - Last week, despite higher UST yields, the threat of BoJ intervention kept yen bears in check. JPY stayed rather flat with the USD/JPY having a fleeting test of 150 towards the end of the week. - This week, unverified reports of discussion of YCC tweaks add further restrains to JPY bears.

With recent wage negotiation reports seemingly backing the case for policy tweaks, JPY bears a wall of cau

Furthermore, last Friday, BoJ Governor Ueda's caution of the need for interest rate risks management given extremely high uncertainties over the economy and inflation imparts further warning for JPY bears as well.

- All in, the USD/JPY is likely to trade in the 148 to mid-150 range

EUR: Of Peaks and Plateau

- As expected, the EUR was unable to muster much of a climb as it stayed below 1.06 last week

The ECB is widely expected to keep policy rates unchanged this week.
 Absent of any dovish tendencies, the EUR will remain buoyed above 1.05 given that much weakness has been factored in. Even if the ECB decides to push their peak rates higher, the sharp EUR impulse is

likely to fade and fail 1.07 tests

Early relief on hostsage which delays ground conflict but does not defuse tensions imply that slippage below mid-1.05 is par for the course.

SGD: Externally driven

No surprises likely to Singapore's data this week, as the numbers should corroborate MAS' October monetary policy, which alluded to a broad disinflationary trend, still-firm labour market and signs of

industrial activity pick-up as the electronic cycle turns up modestly. - Key data events to watch for the SGD would be US Q3 GDP and inflation data, and ECB policy decision, with the former two being the stronger driver.

- Continued strength in the US economy accompanied by benign inflation would provide support to the SGD as bets on the next Fed hike moves further out the time horizon.
- Strength would be contained within mid-1.36 as the Israel-Hamas war continues in the background. Any flare-up in oil could see the USD/SGD rally, with testing of 1.38 plausible.

AUD: Under-performance, Not Under-dog - It is tempting to suggest that the RBA's "hawkish" surprise in alluding to less patience for elevated inflation to subside should power AUD up.

Especially as the backdrop of elevated energy prices means that AUD ought to be relatively betterplaced And the rose tinted view may be one of the Under-dog waiting to make the move

But soft details of China's headline GDP out-run dampen AUD from the outset.
 Add to that the US exceptionalism narrative, likely to be underscored by US Q3 GDP buoyancy, and

AUD cannot deny pressures from UST yields and the Greenback. - With IDR struggling despite Bank Indonesia's surprise hike, which that walked back earlier assertions of being done with tightening, the message may be that the bar is higher to challenge the Greenback.

- And so AUD is perhaps set to disappoint with mid-0.62 to sub-0.64 under-performance rather than thrill as the Under-dog that rallies past 0.64 to 0.65.

Bond Yield (%)

20-Oct	2-yr	Chg (bp)^	10-yr	Chg (bp)^	Curve		
USD	5.073	1.9	4.914	30.2	Steepening		
GER	3.112	-1.8	2.887	15.4	Steepening		
JPY	0.068	3.2	0.828	7.9	Steepening		
SGD	3.604	0.8	3.358	7.8	Steepening		
AUD	4.268	24.7	4.744	0.1	Flattening		
GBP	4.854	4.4	4.649	26.6	Steepening		
Stock Market							

Close % Chg S&P 500 (US) 4,224.16 -2.39 31,259.36 -3.27 Nikkei (JP) EuroStoxx (EU) 4.024.68 -2.69 FTSE STI (SG) 3.076.69 -3.42 JKSE (ID) 6.849.17 -1.12PSEI (PH) 6,142.90 -1.97 KLCI (MY) 1,441.04 -0.21 SET (TH) 1.399.35 SENSEX (IN) 65.397.62 1.34 ASX (AU) 6,900.72 -2.13

US Treasuries: Of Reversions and Inversions


- After a staggering 30bp increase in 10Y UST yields last week, the focus has is inevitable now a reversion back to a normal upward sloping yield curve given that the 10Y-2Y spread is now just less than 20bps

- The possibility of a reversion in the next two weeks is certainly non-trivial

 On the front end, with Fed Chair Powell is likely to continue to transmit his patient messaging, upside in 2Y yields will remain limited. Meanwhile, further climb in 10Y UST vields may not be straightforward and will be highly volatile.

While UST 10Y yields will attempt to test 5%, the growth implication of higher long term borrowing cost on risks assets will continue to play out and re-affirm haven needs. On balance, 2Y yields will buoyed above 5% while 10Y yields trade in the 4.85%-5.05% range.

Inversion will likely be retained for now barring a sharp upside surprise in US GDP which may allow fleeting reversions.



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